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A recent paper by Muciño, Okon and Sudarsky attempts an assessment of the Relational Interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics. The paper presupposes assumptions that are precisely those questioned
in the Relational Interpretation, thus undermining the value of the assessment.
I. THE PROBLEM OF QUANTUM PHYSICS
The problem of quantum physics is not that we have
no way of making sense of it. The problem is that we
have many ways of making sense of it. But each of these
comes with a high conceptual price.
Each interpretation of quantum mechanics demand us
to accept conceptual steps that for many are hard to
digest. Pilot-Wave like interpretations require a non-
local layer of reality which is inaccessible in principle;
Many-Worlds interpretations require zillions of real ac-
tual copies of ourselves seeing slightly different worlds;
Qbism forces us to a strong instrumentalism; Physi-
cal Collapse models require physical processes that have
never been observed; Relational Quantum Mechanics as-
sumes that contingent properties are sparse and relative.
And so on.
Richard Feynman observed that Nature often admits
different interpretations of the same phenomena. He sug-
gested that a good scientists should better keep all alter-
native in mind, not knowing which one will next turn
out to be good. Perhaps this is a good attitude for quan-
tum theory. As science develop, one perspective may well
turn out to be more fruitful. One price will turn out to
be worth paying.
In one form or the other, all approaches are radical
(because the novelty of quantum theory to be radical),
but the conceptual assumptions of the different interpre-
tations are in general radically different. For this rea-
son, communication between scientists and philosophers
working within different interpretations is sometimes un-
easy: it often reduces to an empty restatement of alter-
natives “beliefs”.
This is unfortunately the case of the “assessment”
of Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) [1] recently
attempted by Muciño, Okon and Sudarsky (MOS) [2].
These authors are defenders of Physical Collapse mod-
els [3–6]. They give for granted a number of conceptual
assumptions that ground the Physical Collapse interpre-
tation of quantum mechanics. They evaluate RQM start-
ing from the conceptual assumptions on which their own
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work is based, and find that that RQM does not solve
their problems.
MOS fail to see that RQM is coherent (as other in-
terpretations are), but at the price of giving up a priori
assumptions that they are not ready to give up. Hence
their “assessment” of RQM end up being empty: they do
find contradictions, but the contradictions are not within
RQM; they are contradiction between the RQM and as-
sumptions that are given for granted by the author’s, but
are not commonly accepted.
In this paper, I discuss in detail the assessment of RQM
that they give, and explain in detail why it misses the
point.
II. RQM IN A NUTSHEL
This is not the place for a detailed description of RQM,
for which I refer to the literature [1, 7–9]. But for the
purpose of clarity, I give here a compact account of this
interpretation (as I understand it today).
The basic idea is that the world can be decomposed (in
many alternative manners) into “physical systems” that
interact among themselves. Each physical system can be
characterized by a set (in fact, an algebra) of physical
variables A1, ..., An. These variables do not represent
how the system is, but rather what the system does to
another system, when there is an interaction. Outside
this context, they are not determined [10, 11].
Physical variables (i) take value only at interactions
and (ii) the value they take is relative to the interacting
system. The occurrence that a variable takes a value at
an interaction is called a quantum event.
For a given system S, its quantum theory specifies its
variables An, the set of values an that each of these can
take (that is, their spectrum), and gives probabilities
P (an; bn) for values an relative to a second system O,
as a function of values bn relative to this same system O.
Values taken by variables are labelled by the systems
in interaction, but it can be shown [9] that the effect of
decoherence is to render the labelling irrelevant as soon
as quantum interference is suppressed.
Key features of this interpretation, important for what
follows are:
(a) The interpretation is realist in the sense that it de-
2
scribes the world as a collection of real systems interact-
ing via discrete relative quantum events.
(b) The wave function is interpreted epistemically, in
the same manner in which its classical limit, namely the
Hamilton-Jacobi function, is.
(c) There are no special systems playing the role of “ob-
servers”, no special role given to “agents”, or “subjects of
knowledge”, no fundamental role given to special “mea-
surement” contexts.
(d) The traditional tension between unitary evolution
and wave function collapse is resolved by relativising val-
ues. That is, the evolution of the probability distribution
of the values of variables relative to a system O is pre-
dicted by unitary evolution only as long as S is isolated
and does not interact with O. This does not conflict
with the fact that variables of subsystems of S can take
value with respect to one another, because the quantum
mechanical transition amplitudes only connect values rel-
ative to the same system. In a slogan: with respect to
Schrödinger’s cat the poison is definitely out or not, but
this has no bearing on the possibility of an external ob-
server to observe quantum interference effects between
the two alternatives.
(e) A coherent picture of the world is provided by all
the values of variables with respect to any single system;
juxtaposing values relative to different systems generates
apparent incongruences, which are harmless because they
refer to a non-existing “view from outside the world”.
These minimal notes should be sufficient to address the
points raised by MOS.
III. HOW MOS DEFINE THE PROBLEM OF
QUANTUM MECHANICS
The characterisation of the problem of quantum me-
chanics (QM) that MOS give is idiosyncratic. It makes
sense if we remember that they expect that the only way
to solve it is to introduce a physical collapse mechanism.
According to MOS, the problem of QM is indeed the
following: say a Stern-Gerlach apparatus entangles the
position of a particle with the z component of the spin.
Schematically, with obvious notation:
|ψ〉 ∼ |1〉 ⊗ |+〉z + |2〉 ⊗ |−〉z. (1)










The problem of QM, according to MOS is: why then
this same apparatus does not measure the x component
of the spin? In their words: “Without information not
contained in a complete quantum description, standard
quantum mechanics is unable to deliver concrete predic-
tions regarding the possible final outcomes of an experi-
ment.”
This is a bizzarre characterization of the problem.
Of course standard quantum mechanics is able to de-
liver concrete predictions regarding the possible final out-
comes of an experiment, as any experimenter can testify.
The reason is that “standard quantum mechanics” is not
only a quantum state evolving unitarily. Standard quan-
tum mechanics as formulated in textbooks (mostly in the
Copenhagen language) includes much more: operators
associated to measuring procedures, eigenvalues, the ex-
istence Bohr’s macroscopic world and so on. Once you
fold these ingredients in, predictions are clear.
Of course there are good reason to consider the Copen-
hagen interpretation unsatisfactory, and interpretations
that have a larger applicability arguably exist. With the
possible exception of Many Words, in general other inter-
pretations do not start by simply discarding everything
except the evolving state. Hence the characterization of
the problem given by MOS is, at most, a potential ob-
jection to Many Worlds, certainly not the general formu-
lation of the problem of quantum theory.
What equations (1) and (2) show is that there are (spe-
cial) cases in which the bi-orthogonal decomposition of a
state is not unique. This is well known. It is a potential
problem only for the interpretations of quantum mechan-
ics that rely on the bi-orthogonal decomposition, such as
modal interpretations [12–14] or some versions of Many
World. The bi-orthogonal decomposition theorem plays
no role in many other interpretations and in particular
in RQM, which is about variables, not about states.
More explicitly, this is the definition of the problem of
QM given my MOS: “The formalism [of RQM] ends up
critically depending upon the notion of measurement—
which is a problem because such a notion is never pre-
cisely defined within the theory. And it is not only that
the standard theory does not specify when a measure-
ment happens, it also does not prescribe what it is that
is being measured (i.e., in which basis will the collapse
occur).”
Notice that the problem is formulated in terms of
“measurement”. But the notion of “measurement” plays
no role in RQM. In fact, the entire logic of RQM is to
give up any notion of “special” interactions that should
count as “measurements”.
Since MOS work in Collapse Models, their assump-
tion is that that reality is described objectively and uni-
versally by an evolving wave function. This wave func-
tion evolves unitarily until something “special” happen.
This special is the “measurement”. Recall that in Col-
lapse Models something (a fundamental frequency [15], a
threshold in the gravitational self-potential [16],...) must
determine the occurrence of the physical collapse. Under
this logic, MOS asks whether there is something “special”
that determines when a measurements happen in RQM.
The answer is that there is no “measurement” in RQM.
There is no universal objective wave function either, in
RQM.
The formulation of the problem of QM according to
MOS is predicated on the basis of assumptions that are
explicitly rejected in RQM.
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IV. WHICH VARIABLE TAKES VALUE
Nevertheless, we can still try to translate the question
posed by MOS into the language of RQM and see if it may
refers to anything. The question could be which variable
of a system takes value relative to another system (that
is, when does a quantum event happen), and when does
it do so.
Recall that the setting of RQM is not a uniformly
evolving quantum state. It is a setting in which two spe-
cific distinguishable physical systems are singled out, say
S and P . Quantum mechanics gives descriptions of the
world conditional to this (arbitrary) choice and describes
how one system affects the other when they interact. The
theory can therefore be applied anytime we have two well
distinct systems interacting.
Which variable takes value in the interaction is dic-
tated by the physics: in the classical theory, we can de-
scribe the interaction between the two systems, say, in
terms of an interaction term in the Hamiltonian that de-
pends, in particular, say, on a variable A of the system S:
then A is the value that takes value. The reason is that
the interaction Hamiltonian depends on the property of
S responsable in determining the effect of S on O. And
this is precisely how quantum theory describes the world
(in RQM): the way systems affects one another.
The formulation of the problem in terms of the states
(1) and (2) above does not even make sense in RQM: the
theory is about values of variables, not about states.
V. WHEN DOES A VARIABLE TAKE VALUE
To the question of the time when the quantum event
happens, the answer is similar. It happens when the
systems interact. In turn, we may ask when do the sys-
tems interact. The answer is the (quantum) physics of S,
given its dynamics and the interaction terms in its hamil-
tonian. For instance, suppose that S is an electron in a
radioactive atom and P is a Geiger counter. When does
a quantum event relative to these two systems happen?
Notice that the Schrödinger wave function of the elec-
tron leaks continuously out of the atom and is therefore
constantly in causal contact with the Geiger counter. The
electric force of the electron on the Geiger counter, irre-
spectively of the position of the electron is never exactly
zero. If you start with a wave function ontology you
have the problem of understanding what happens when
the Geiger counter clicks and when it does so. But the
RQM ontology is not the continuous wave function leak-
age. It is the actual quantum event of the clicking of
the Geiger counter, which is discrete. When does it hap-
pen? Knowing the Hamiltonian of the system and the
interaction hamiltonian with the affected system, stan-
dard quantum mechanics can be used to determine the
probability distribution in time of the occurrence of the
interaction. That is, quantum events are discrete, their
occurrence can be predicted only probabilistically, and
the probability distribution of their occurrence can be
computed using quantum mechanics itself and the spe-
cific quantum dynamics in play.
The difficult conceptual step here is to accept the idea
that continuity is a large scale approximation, while the
happenings of the world are discrete and probabilistic
at the quantum scale. In its relational interpretation,
quantum theory describes a world that is fundamentally
discrete and probabilistic. Exchanges between system are
always discrete and regulated by the quantum of action
~.
This is precisely the original intuition of Max Born and
its collaborators in Göttigen [17–20], who were the first
creators of quantum theory. But it is also the conclu-
sion to which their opponent, one of the most strenu-
ous defenders of continuity and deepest thinkers about
the problems of the theory, Erwin Schrödinger, ended up
accepting: “There was a moment when the creators of
wave mechanics (that is, himself) harboured the illusion
of having eliminated discontinuity from quantum theory.
But the discontinuities eliminated from the equations of
the theory reappear the moment the theory is confronted
with what we observe. [...] it is better to consider a
particle not as a permanent entity but rather as an in-
stantaneous event. Sometimes these events form chains
that give the illusion of being permanent, but only in
particular circumstances.”[21]
MOS reject this logic a priori, because they interpret
quantum measurements as “special events” that happen
to a realistically interpreted wave function under peculiar
circumstances to be specified, not as the general happen-
ing of all phenomena.
Within MOS’s Physical Collapse logic, RQM does not
answer MOS’s question. But this is not because of an in-
coherence of RQM, it is only because MOS have a priori
assumptions that are rejected in RQM. The assumptions
of RQM are similar to the original ones of Born and col-
laborators. The assumptions of MOS are the early ones
(lately rejected) by Erwin Schrödinger.
VI. WHEN DOES MEASUREMENT HAPPEN
In their quest for finding a rule for an objective and sys-
tem independent condition for quantum measurement,
MOS make reference to an old article with a latin title
“Incertus tempus, incertisque loci: when does a measure-
ment happen” [22]. What MOS search, namely an ob-
jective criterium singling out quantum measurement, is
not in that paper, because the paper addresses a different
problem.
In RQM terms, that paper asks the following question.
Suppose that two systems S and O interact among them-
selves. If we consider only values of variables relative to a
third system, P , is there anything we can say in terms of
these values about the timing of a quantum event realised
by the interactions between S and O?
At first sights the answer seems to be negative, be-
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cause the values of the variables with respect to P are
blind to the values of the variables of S with respect
to O. Yet, [22] points out that there is an operational
sense that can be given to this question. The intuition
is that if Wigner has a friend making a measurement in
a closed box, Wigner –with sufficient knowledge of what
is in the box– can say something about when his friend
makes the measurement, even if he has no access to it.
This intuition is made concrete in [22] as follows. The
previous interactions between the S ∪ O system and P
give probabilistic predictions about what would P see
(that is, how S∪O would affect P ) if an interaction with
P happened at some arbitrary time. Now consider an
interaction where O’s “pointer” variable affects (“is seen
by”) P . The predictions can include the timing when the
pointer move, even if they do not include which direction
it will moves. Hence P can predict “when the measure-
ment happen” under a special definition: with respect to
P , a measurement between O and S happens when P can
predict that the the pointer variable has moved. Since
the prediction is probabilistic, this gives only a proba-
bility distribution of course. That is, figuratively, “I say
that the measurement has happened with probability p
if I predict that I will find the pointer moved (correlated
with the S’s variable, which P can independently detect)
with probability p”. This peculiar operational definition
does in fact correspond to what one would concretely say
in a laboratory, but has nothing to do with the founda-
tion of RQM. MOS misinterpret it as foundational.
MOS observe that this operational definition is based
on the notion of quantum event itself. This is correct, or
course. Their objection is that this implies a regression
at infinity. This is wrong, because the notion of quan-
tum event does not require such indirect operational def-
inition. The observation counts as an objection only if
one asks, as MOS do, an absolute non-relational deter-
mination of quantum events, and searches it in [22]. But
a non-relational definition of quantum events is exactly
what RQM mechanics demands not to ask, in order to
make sense of quantum physics.
VII. OBSERVER DEPENDENCE
An explicit criticisms of MOS regards a statement con-
tained in the paper that has inspired RQM, the 1995 pa-
per [7]. The paper says that “the experimental evidence
at the basis of quantum mechanics forces us to accept
that “distinct observers give different descriptions of the
same events”. MOS object that this not true and cite
pilot-wave theory as contrary evidence. Here MOS are
confusing two different facts. One is the assumption re-
alised in the pilot-wave theory that there exist a universal
objective state of affairs. A different one is the account
that a real observer can give of a set of events. Since the
pilot-wave theory is a hidden variable theory, observers
do not have access to the universal objective state of af-
fairs. This is hidden. In particular, the global wave func-
tion postulated by the pilot wave theory is in principle
inaccessible to observers (otherwise the pilot wave theory
could be used to make non-probabilistic predictions and
beat standard quantum theory, which is not the case). In
fact, what happens in the pilot wave theory is that ob-
servers can make predictions using “effective” quantum
states. These are relative states and observer dependent.
Thus confirming the observation in [7]. Therefore the
MOS objection has no ground.
The other argument that MOS cite as evidence against
the statement above is –not surprisingly– physical col-
lapse model. It is of course true that collapse model do
violate the observation in [7], but they violate the predic-
tions of standard quantum theory as well (which is obvi-
ous by the fact that they are empirically distinguishable
from standard quantum theory), while [7] states clearly
that everything it says is within the validity of standard
quantum theory. RQM makes sense of quantum theory
(the most successful physical theory ever) as it is, not
under the assumption that it fails. This can be seen
directly: the detailed argument used in [7] to derive the
above statement is based on the existence of certain quan-
tum interference effects predicted by quantum theory and
not predicted by Physical Collapse models.
In the course of this discussion, MOS reiterate their
prejudice about quantum collapse (“In sum, a core con-
ceptual problem of standard quantum mechanics has to
do with an ambiguity regarding the dynamics.”), they
interpret observer dependence as due to the fact that
quantum collapse is disregarded (“Such an ambiguity al-
lows for different observers to give different descriptions
of the same events.”) and essentially blame RQM only
for not adhering to their view.
VIII. SELF MEASUREMENT
A long section of the paper is devoted by MOS to criti-
cise an observation about an assumed impossibility of self
measurement in [7]. The observations about self mea-
surement in that old paper are indeed vague. In fact
these vague considerations have been abandoned in later
presentations of RQM and replaced by sharper definitions
[1]. For instance, in the condensed summary given above,
variables are interpreted as describing the way a system
affect other systems. The point is of course that the
“R” in RQM stands for “relations”: RQM is an account
of quantum physics in terms of relations, namely rela-
tive variables. It assumes that physics is about relative
variables, describing how systems manifest themselves to
other systems.
MOS clearly misunderstand this. For instance they
write “Returning to Rovelli’s statement that there is no
meaning in being correlated with oneself, we must say
that we find such a claim quite odd. [...] it is clear that
the different parts of an observer certainly are correlated
between them: her left hand is never more that 2 me-
ters away from the right one.” This objections betrays
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the misunderstanding that MOS have of RQM. In the
case considered, of course one hand has a position with
respect to another hand. The two hands can interact,
exchange light signals, etcetera. But it is so precisely
because they are two! What is the position of a single
hand if there is noting else with respect to which can be
defined? Position is in fact a quintessential example of a
relational property in physics: it is always defined with
respect to something else.
IX. DECOHERENCE AND UNITARITY
Another misunderstanding is in MOS’s reading of the
paper [9] which explore the role of decoherence in RQM.
MOS write “More recently Rovelli [...] has argued that
decoherence plays a crucial role in explaining the break-
down of unitarity”. This is a misunderstanding of the pa-
per. Decoherence plays no role in the breaking of unitar-
ity. The unitary evolution of the probability distribution
the values of the variables of the system S with respect
to a system P holds only as long as S can be considered
isolated. At every interaction of S with something else,
unitary evolution of S alone breaks down simply because
S is not anymore isolated. If S interacts with a second
system O, the unitary evolution of S ∪O (relative to P )
stills hold, but when S interacts with P there is definitely
a breaking of the unitary evolution of its variables with
respect to P . Unitary evolution holds for any system,
but only as long as it refers to probabilites of interac-
tions with something external.
All this has nothing to do with decoherence. The role
of decoherence in RQM is completely different. How is it
possible that a stable world described by variables that
are not relative emerge form the quantum world where
variables are always relative? The paper [9] analyses this
question and shows that decoherence, which is a concrete
physical phenomenon, perfectly accounts for this.
MOS argue in detail (and correctly) that decoherence
alone does not solve the problem of the interpretation
of quantum mechanics; they refer to their own Physical
Collapse prejudice that the problem of quantum mechan-
ics is to find a concrete mechanism that breaks unitarity;
they misinterpret [9] as an argument to say that decoher-
ence is the source of the breaking of unitarity of RQM;
and thus conclude, mistakenly, that there is a problem.
Breaking of unitarity is a trivial consequence of the per-
spectival aspects of RQM. That is: evolution of anything
is unitary, as long as it refers to how this “anything”
affects something considered external to it.
X. ONTOLOGY
There is an interesting observation in MOS, regarding
the quantum event ontology. They observe that a quan-
tum event given by the manifestation of the position of
a particle can be precisely located in spacetime, but not
so for example for the momentum. This fact was noted
earlier, in fact it was clear to Max Born himself [20] in
his 1925 formulation of quantum theory [17, 18], and is
emphasized in Niels Bohr long ruminations about com-
plementarity between position and momentum. This is
general in quantum theory: since sharp momentum im-
plies spread position, attributing a sharp momentum to
a particle is not a statement regarding a sharp spacetime
location.
I think that the impossibility to always sharply locate
values of variables is just an indirect aspect of the non
locality of quantum theory. RQM does not aspire to get
rid of all non local aspects of quantum theory, which
are just aspects of Nature. The Schrödinger equation
of two particles describes physics that in a very precise
sense is non-local. Nature has certain some local aspects,
but we should not impose to Nature the prejudice that
everything works as in relativistic classical field theory.
Another objection in MOS is that RQM leads to solip-
sism or “quasi-solipsism” (whatever this means). This
in fact is a common objection to RQM in popular on-
line forums, but is a funny one for a perspective entirely
based on relations! It is true that RQM assumes that
variables take value relative to systems, but nothing in
RQM prevents the world to include complex “observers”
like humans, that can converse among themselves and
compare what they “observe” as observers. In fact, the
theory itself guarantees that if two such observers mea-
sure (this time the term is appropriate) the same quantity
and compare notes, they find agreement. This was dis-
cussed in great detail in [7] and was crucial to show that
RQM is not incoherent [23, 24], as was sometimes feared
in its early days.
There is an aspect of the ontology that is left open
in the RQM literature: whether a system ontology or a
quantum event ontology is more convincing. I think that
RQM is compatible with both, and each has its own ap-
peal. In the first, we assume that what exists is an elec-
tron, and its manifestations are sparse quantum event.
In the second, we assume that what exists are sparse
quantum events and we call electron their ensemble and
their dynamical relations. I think that both views are
viable. After all, we can say that there is a chair, and its
manifestation are all the perspectives on it, or we can say
with Hume, that a chair is nothing else that the coher-
ent ensemble of all its manifestations. I see no reasons
for which QM should decide a metaphysical issue that is
open independently from quantum theory itself.
A similar remark hold for the formulation of the the-
ory as a principle theory in terms of information. This
perspective was emphasized in [7], and has had a deter-
mined influence on the later development of diverse infor-
mational interpretations of quantum physics, including
Qbism [25]. These ideas have lead to important successes
in the reconstruction of quantum theory from informa-
tion theoretical axioms [26–28]. But the risk of excessive
emphasis on the language of information and the ambi-
guity of the word “information” which is used with wide
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variations of meaning risks to push towards what seems
to me an excessive instrumentalist stance. If there is one
thing I agree with MOS is that what we wish to get from
quantum theory is a credible account of, as far as we
know, the world works.
XI. EPR
The paper [29] analysis the EPR scenario at the light
of RQM. MOS object to that analysis posing the follow-
ing problem: The two spatially separated observers mea-
sure spin “along the same axis, at space-like separation
from each other. Suppose, moreover, that, in accordance
with the possibilities allowed by RQM, they both obtain
spin-up. After performing such a measurement, both of
them travel to the mid-point between their labs and, at
the same time, announce their results. What would then
happen?” MOS argue that according to RQM a contra-
diction may emerge because nothing prevents A and B
from reporting the same spin, against angular momentum
conservation. This is a factual mistake. What “happens”
in RQM is how a system affect another system. Without
specifying with respect to which system are the variables
taking value, the question is meaningless. MOS want to
avoid referring to either A or B as observers. This is
possible in RQM. It suffice to ask how A and B affect an
external system, call it P . The probability that A and
B report contradictory results can be calculated using
standard quantum mechanics, and is zero. The mistake
of MOS is the common source of confusion in the EPR
scenario, according to RQM: forgetting that A and B are
themselves quantum systems and treating them classi-
cally. If we assume that they are classical, we generate
the contradiction. If we keep their quantum nature in
mind, there is no contradiction in any set of events rela-
tive to a single system. It is to juxtapose events relative
to different systems that creates the illusion of a conflict.
Facts are genuinely relative [30–33], a point of view “from
outside the universe” is genuinely excluded [34].
XII. LOCALITY
The discussion of locality in MOS reflects the general
pattern. MOS take locality as the requirement that there
are local beable in the sense of Bell that obey Bell local
causality. They then argue that his is not the case in
RQM. This is true in fact, and is precisely what is argued
in the paper [35]. What is then argued in [35] that in the
light of RQM this non locality is a simple consequence
of the fact that some variables are not defined at some
times. MOS equivocate on this statement, reinterpreting
it as meaning that the variables are well defined but not
deterministically determined. No surprise on this, be-
cause MOS assume that there is always a unique deter-
mined state, this is part of their assumptions, assumption
abandoned in RQM. Hence they misunderstand [35] and
wrongly conclude that the conclusion of [35] is “false”.
XIII. CONCLUSION
Altogether, the paper [2] turns out to be an exercise
in misunderstanding. This is not surprising, because the
paper is really an attempt to make sense of RQM in the
context of the hypotheses underlying a Physical Collapse
interpretation of Quantum Theory. It is an attempt of
interpreting RQM on the basis of assumptions rejected
by RQM.
The article could be read as an indirect way to pro-
mote the Physical Collapse perspective by using RQM
as a straw man. It is written as if it was based on an
“objective” position, based on commonly accepted as-
sumptions. But the facts and assumptions that it gives
for granted are far from being commonly accepted. They
are the specific assumptions of the authors’ “camp”. The
authors have employed this strategy elsewhere [36]. This
invalidates the value of the assessment.
Unfortunately, this happens repeatedly in debates
about the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Defend-
ers of one interpretation construct detailed arguments
trying to show that another interpretation is “wrong”,
failing to see that what they are doing is simply applying
their own hypotheses to the logic of authors that have
alternative hypotheses.
The difficulty of quantum mechanics is not about
carefully articulating consequences of a shared concep-
tual framework: it is to understand which conceptual
framework is more promising for making sense of
the theory. As mentioned in the introduction, every
interpretation of QM includes conceptual steps hard
to digest. The exercise of criticising the details of an
interpretation without accepting these conceptual steps
is futile. I am sure we can do better, in articulating a
fruitful conversation between different ways of making
sense of quantum theory.
***
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